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Can President Trump 'open up' the libel laws?
ibel and slander are branches of
the law of defamation. Defama
tion law authorizes remedies
for reputational harm caused by
some false statements of fact. A libel
is a defamatory statement that is
printed or written; a slander is a
defamatory statement that is spo
ken.
During the 2016 presidential cam
paign, candidate Donald Trump sug
gested that, if elected, he would
"open up our libel laws" to facilitate
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lawsuits by public officials against
news organizations.
A few weeks ago, President
Trump concluded a tweet critical of
the New York Times with the rhetori
cal question: "Change libel laws?"
And last weekend, White House
Chief of Staff Reince Priebus stated
that the administration has looked
into modifying the law of libel.
So what power does the Constitu
tion give the president to "open up"
the libel laws? In truth, almost none.

For starters, libel and slander are

state law causes of action. There are
no federal statutes that generally
regulate libel or slander. And the
Supreme Court has ruled that the
Constitution does not pretect harm
to one's reputation.
Obviously, the president has no
power to alter state law. And just as
obviously, he has no power to enact
federal law on his own.
Sometimes, the president may use
SEE CONsmuTION 03
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his law enforcement discre
tion t.o change the ways in
which federal laws are ad
ministered. Consider, for ex
ample, President Trump's re
cent executive orders man
dating stricter enforcement
of federal immigration
statutes.
But, again, there is no fed
eral law of libel or slander for
the president t.o enforce more
or less strictly.
So what then is the presi
dent considering?
One path forward could be
for the president to ask
Congress to enact a federal
libel law that is more to his
liking than the laws presently
on the books in the states.
But such a request would al
most certainly fail.
First, many in Congress
would surely view such a pro
posal as an unwarranted at

tack on our free press. A free
press has long been consid
ered a linchpin of democracy
and necessary for trans
parency in government. Ex
posing the press to libel suits
could deter it from perform
ing its essential functions.
Second, many in Congress
would surely conclude that,
even if the Constitution were
t.o permit the federalization of
the law of libel (a doubtful
proposition), actually doing
so would constitute an inap
propriate federal intrusion
into a regulatory area prop
erly reserved to the states.
But let's suppose, purely
for the sake of argument, that
the president could persuade
Congress to enact legislation
making it easier for public of
ficials to sue the press, and
that such legislation could
plausibly be grounded in a
power the Constitution gives
to Congress. Even so, any

and four African American
clergymen who authored a
full-page advertisement, ti
tled "Heed Their Rising
Voices," that ran on March
29, 1960. The advertisement
described aspects of the vio
lent Southern resistance to
the civil rights movement and
solicited funds for the de
fense of Martin Luther King,
Jr., who had been indicted for
perjury,
The plaintiff, a commis
sioner of the city of Mont
gomery, Ala., with responsi
bility for public safety, com
plained that a number of rela
tively minor factual inaccura
cies about the Montgomery
police force contained in the
advertisement had caused
him reputational harm. An
Alabama jury agreed and
New York Times v. Sullivan.
awarded him $500,000. The
Alabama Supreme Court af
New York Times v. Sulli
van arose out of a libel action firmed But the United States
Supreme Court, in an opinion
brought against the paper
such legislation would violate
the free speech and free
press guarantees of the First
Amendment.
Under current law, the
states are not free to fashion
the law of libel and slander as
they see fit. Rather, because
libel and slander actions seek
monetary damage awards
that punish defamatory
speech, the Supreme Court
has interpreted the First
Amendment to place a num
ber of limits on how states
can define them.
One such limit makes it
exceedingly difficult for
elected officials - and, indeed,
public figures generally - to
prevail in a libel or slander
action: the legal rule formu
lated in the Supreme Court's
landmark 1964 decision in

by Justice William Brennan,
reversed.
Taking note of our "pro
found national commitment
to the principle that debate
on public issues should be
uninhibited, robust, and wide
open, and that it may well in
clude vehement, caustic, and
sometimes unpleasantly
sharp attacks on government
and public officials," the
court held that the First
Amendment bars a public of
ficial from establishing libel
unless he proves by clear and
convincing evidence that the
defendant published a false
statement about him with
"actual malice" - that is, with
knowledge of its falsity or a
reckless disregard of the
truth.
In practice, this standard
is nearly impossible to satisfy.
So is there anything else
the president could do to
"open up" our libel laws?

The Supreme Court has
not shown an interest in re
treating from New York
Times v. Sullivan, so only
one option remains: to seek a
constitutional amendment
overturning the case's actual
malice standard. Unless we
were to call a second consti
tutional convention, such an
amendment would require
approval by two-thirds of
each house of Congress, and
then three-fourths (37) of the
states. This simply is not go
ing to happen. The bottom
line is this: The Constitution
does not allow the president
to open up the libel laws.
(John Greahe teaches con
stitutional law and related
subjects at the University af
New Hampshire School of
Law. He also serves on the
board of trustees of the New
Hampshire Institute for
Civics Education. )

